Persuasive Design in Teaching and Learning

The EuroPLOT project (2010-2013) has developed Persuasive Learning and Technologies (PLOTs) and has evaluated them in four real-world case studies, which cover the widely different teaching scenarios of university education, adult learning in industry, informal learning at a museum, literature studies, and language learning. At the International Workshop of EuroPLOT Persuasive Technology for Learning, Education and Teaching (IWEPLET 2013), the results of the project were presented, and an overview of related research was given. One of the main conclusions of EuroPLOT has been that the specific learning context has to be considered when applying persuasive designs. At IWEPLET 2013, both the theoretical background as well as evaluations of persuasive technology demonstrations were presented. This paper provides an overview of these presentations

Fatalism and Future Contingents

In this paper I address issues related to the problem of future contingents and the metaphysical doctrine of fatalism. Two classical responses to the problem of future contingents are the third truth value view and the all-false view. According to the former, future contingents take a third truth value which goes beyond truth and falsity. According to the latter, they are all false. I here illustrate and discuss two ways to respectively argue for those two views. Both ways are similar in spirit and intimately connected with fatalism, in the sense that they engage with the doctrine of fatalism and accept a large part of a standard fatalistic machinery

Demonstration of PLOTs from the EuroPLOT project

The EuroPLOT project (2010-2013) has been funded to explore the concept of persuasive design for learning and teaching. It has developed Persuasive Learn-ing Objects and Technologies (PLOTs), manifested in two tools and a set of learning objects that have been tested and evaluated in four different case studies. These PLOTs will be shown in this demonstration, and the participants can try them out and experience for themselves the impact of persuasive technology that is embedded in these PLOTs. This will be one authoring tool (PLOTMaker) and one delivery tool (PLOTLearner). Furthermore, there will be learning objects shown which have been developed for those four different case studies. All of these PLOTs have already been tested and evaluated during case studies with real learners

Persuasive Technology for Learning and Teaching – The EuroPLOT Project

The concept of persuasive design has demonstrated its benefits by changing human behavior in certain situations, but in the area of education and learning, this approach has rarely been used. To change this and to study the feasibility of persuasive technology in teaching and learning, the EuroPLOT project (PLOT = Persuasive Learning Objects and Technologies) has been funded 2010-2013 by the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA) in the Life-long Learning (LLL) programme. In this program two tools have been developed (PLOTMaker and PLOTLearner) which allow to create learning objects with inherently persuasive concepts embedded. These tools and the learning objects have been evaluated in four case studies: language learning (Ancient Hebrew), museum learning (Kaj Munk Museum, Denmark), chemical handling, and academic Business Computing. These case studies cover a wide range of different learning styles and learning groups, and the results obtained through the evaluation of these case studies show the wide range of success of persuasive learning. They also indicate the limitations and areas where improvements are required

The Invisible Thin Red Line

The aim of this paper is to argue that the adoption of an unrestricted principle of bivalence is compatible with a metaphysics that (i) denies that the future is real, (ii) adopts nomological indeterminism, and (iii) exploits a branching structure to provide a semantics for future contingent claims. To this end, we elaborate what we call Flow Fragmentalism, a view inspired by Kit Fine (2005)’s non-standard tense realism, according to which reality is divided up into maximally coherent collections of tensed facts. In this way, we show how to reconcile a genuinely A-theoretic branching-time model with the idea that there is a branch corresponding to the thin red line, that is, the branch that will turn out to be the actual future history of the world

The Metaphysics of the Thin Red Line

There seems to be a minimal core that every theory wishing to accommodate the intuition that the future is open must contain: a denial of physical determinism (i.e. the thesis that what future states the universe will be in is implied by what states it has been in), and a denial of strong fatalism (i.e. the thesis that, at every time, what will subsequently be the case is metaphysically necessary). 1 Those two requirements are often associated with the idea of an objective temporal flow and the non-reality of the future. However, at least certain ways to frame the “openness” intuition do not rely on any of these. Branching Time Theory (BTT) is one such: it is compatible with the denial that time flow is objective and it is couched in a language with a (prima facie) commitment to an eternalist ontology. BTT, though, urges us to resist certain intuitions about the determinacy of future claims, which arguably do not lead either to physical determinism or to fatalism. Against BTT, supporters of the Thin Red Line Theory (TRL) argue that their position avoids determinism and fatalism, while also representing the fact that there is a future which is “special ” because it is the one that will be the case. But starting with Belnap and Green 1994, some have objected to the tenability of TRL, mainly on metaphysical grounds. In particular, those argue that “positing a thin red line amounts to giving up objective indeterminism, ” 2 and that “has unacceptable consequences, ranging from a mistreatment of actuality to an inability to talk coherently about what would have happened had what is going to happen not taken place. ” 3 In this paper, we wish to reframe the 1 Hence, strong fatalism implies physical determinism, while the latter does not imply the former, thus being compatible with the world having been otherwise, assuming that the initial condition of the world could have been otherwise. Also, strong fatalism is intended as opposed to weak fatalism, according to which, whatever I will do now won’t affect what will be the case. Weak fatalism, instead, does not imply, nor is implied, by physical determinism